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Abstract—
User mobility in wireless data networks is increasing because
of technological advances, and the desire for voice and multime-
dia applications. These applications, however, require handoffs
between base stations (or access points) to be fast to maintain the
quality of the connections. In this paper, we introduce a novel
data structure, the Neighbor Graph, which dynamically captures
the mobility topology of the network, and we show how neigh-
bor graphs can be utilized to reduce the authentication timeof an
IEEE 802.11 hand-off from 1.1 seconds (full EAP/TLS) to 50 ms
without loss of security.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless networks, specifically those based on the IEEE
802.11 standard (Wi-Fi), are experiencing rapid growth dueto
their low cost and unregulated bandwidth. As a result of this
tremendous growth, pockets of connectivity have been created
similar to the first few years of the cellular systems. The logi-
cal next step for Wi-Fi based networks is support for fast roam-
ing within the same administrative domain and then eventually
between different administrative domains. Finally, we expect
that roaming between networks of differing physical layers,
i.e. vertical hand-offs, will occur once multi-mode (Wi-Fiand
GSM/CDMA) handsets become more available which will in
turn change how Wi-Fi networks are used.
Previous studies of wireless network mobility have shown
that users tend to roam in what we calldiscrete mobilitywhere
the user utilizes the network while stationary (or connected to
the same base station) and before moving the user ceases op-
eration only to continue using the network after moving to a
new location [1], [2], [3], [4]. That is the users do not usu-
ally move while using the network because the majority of
current network applications and equipment do not easily lend
themselves to what we callcontinuous mobility, where the user
moves while utilizing the network.
Voice based applications are the pre-dominant applicationin
continuous mobilityas seen in the current cellular networks,
and we expect voice and multimedia applications will serve as
the catalyst forcontinuous mobilityin Wi-Fi networks much
as they did for the cellular networks once multi-mode handsets
and end-user applications become more widely available.
Supporting voice and multimedia with continuous mobility,
however, implies that the total latency (layer 2 and layer 3)of
handoffs between base stations must be small. Specifically,the
overall latency should not exceed 50ms to prevent excessive
jitter [5]. Unfortunately, the vast majority of Wi-Fi basednet-
works do not currently meet this goal with the layer 2 latencis
contributing approximately 90% of the overall latency which
exceeds 100ms [6], [7].
Logically, a wireless hand-off is composed of four phases:
probe, decision, association, and authentication. In the probe
phase, the mobile station seeks to identify a candidate set of
next access points via active or passive means. Once the can-
didate set of next access points has been identified, the station
selects the next access point and performs any needed house-
keeping,i.e. flushing buffers etc., in the decision phase. Next,
the mobile station begins the association phase with the se-
lected access point. Finally, authentication or reauthentication
is completed.
In this paper, we focus on improving the authentication delay
incurred during a horizontal hand-off within the same admin-
istrative domain. The current draft for the IEEE 802.11 secu-
rity architecture recommends that this authentication process
be completed using EAP/TLS [8], and EAP/TLS has become
the defacto standard by its inclusion in Windows XP. Unfortu-
nately, a complete EAP/TLS hand-shake, including RADIUS
[9] messages, requires on the order of 1.1 seconds – a number
far too large to support any form of streaming media. To answer
this question, the IEEE included “Pre-authentication” in the
draft which permits a mobile station to “pre-authenticate”itself
to the next access point (see the related work section for a more
complete description). Unfortunately, pre-authentication has
several short comings. First, a station can only pre-authenticate
to another access point on the same local area network, i.e. the
station can not authenticate beyond the first access router.This,
obviously, prevents Wi-Fi networks from reaching much of the
previously discussed vision.
To solve this problem, we designed, implemented, and tested
a solution which only requires only small changes at the AAA
server and access point and supports all of the same secu-
rity properties as EAP/TLS and pre-authentication but at sig-
nificantly reduced latencies. Combining our key distribution
method with a novel algorithm for dynamically identifying and
maintaining the mobility topology of the network,Neighbor
Graphs, results in an efficient key distribution method that
amortizes the cost of the initial EAP/TLS authentication across
all hand-offs within the same administrative domain without
loss of security. By using pro-active key distribution, we re-
duced the latency of the authentication phase from an average
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of 1.1 sec to an average of 50 ms1.
II. IEEE 802.11I AUTHENTICATION OVERVIEW
The authentication framework developed by the IEEE Task
Group I (Security) is a complex combination of several differ-
ent protocols. While a thorough understanding of each of these
protocols is not required, basic knowledge of each will assist
in understanding the problems we are addressing as well as our
solution.
As in any architecture, the trust assumptions are key to the
correct operation of the system. TGi makes the following trust
assumptions: The AAA server is trusted. The access point to which a mobile station is associated is
trusted– Non-associated AP’s are not trusted.
These assumptions, which are different from those in a cellu-
lar network, are due to the nature of 802.11 equipment. Access
points are low cost devices that are often placed in locations
which lack proper physical security. Therefore, it is important
to prevent the compromise of a single AP permitting a compro-
mise of the entire network.
A. IEEE 802.1X
The IEEE 802.1X [10] standard provides an architectural
framework to facilitate network access control at the link layer
for various link technologies (IEEE 802.11, FDDI, Token Ring,
IEEE 802.3 Ethernet, etc.). The standard abstracts the notion f
three entities: thesupplicant, theauthenticatoror the network
port, and theauthenticationserver. Figure 1 shows the com-
munication setup. Asupplicantis an entity that desires to use
a service (link layer connectivity) offered via the notion of a
port on theauthenticator(such as a switch or an access point).
Thus for a single network there will be many ports through
which supplicants can authenticate themselves and obtain net-
work access. Anauthenticatoris in control of a set of ports, and
a network might have multiple authenticators. As an example,
an ethernet switch can be an authenticator, which controls net-
work access on multiple physical ethernet ports available on the
device. In the IEEE 802.11 scenario, a port corresponds to an
association between a supplicant and the authenticator (access
point).
The supplicant authenticates via the authenticator to a central
authentication serverwhich directs the authenticator to provide
access after successful authentication. Typically the authenti-
cation server and the authenticator communicate using theRe-
mote Authentication Dial-In User Service(RADIUS) protocol
([9], [11]). The RADIUS protocol contains mechanisms for
per-packet authenticity and integrity verification between the
AP and the RADIUS server– although these measures are not
as strong as desired.
The authentication process between the authentication server
and the supplicant (via the authenticator) is carried over an Ex-
tensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), which is described in
the following section.1The 50 ms value is for measurements made in our test-bed deployed
throughout a building. We achieved an average of 20 ms in the laboratory,
and have determined that the additional 30 ms delay is due to problems with
the Power Over Ethernet cables used in our test-bed. We are currently repairing
the problem and expect to have 20ms times for the test-bed in few weeks.








Wireless PC Card, etc
Encapsulated EAP
Messages, typically
on RADIUSThe three different roles in IEEE 802.1X:






Fig. 1. The entities in an IEEE 802.1X setup.
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Fig. 2. The EAP stack
B. Extensible Authentication Protocol
The IEEE 802.1X standard employs theExtensible Authen-
tication Protocol [12] to permit a variety of authentication
mechanisms. Figure 2 shows the protocol layers for commu-
nication between the supplicant and the authenticator. EAPis
built around thechallenge-responsecommunication paradigm.
There are four types of messages: EAPRequest, EAP Re-
sponse, EAP Successand EAPFailure. The EAP Request
message is sent to the supplicant indicating a challenge, and
the supplicant replies using the EAP Response message. Af-
ter multiple exchanges of the Request/Response messages the
EAP Success/Failure message is used to notify the supplicant
of the outcome. The common authentication mechanisms used
are EAP-CHAP, EAP-MD5, and for our scenario EAP-TLS
(discussed later).
The EAP messages do not have an addressing mechanism
and are thus encapsulated. TheEAP Over Lan(EAPOL, [10])
protocol carries the EAP packets between the authenticatorand
the supplicant. The EAPOL protocol also provides for the four-
way handshake mechanism (discussed later). Between the au-
thenticator and the authentication server, the EAP messageare
carried over the RADIUS protocol as an attribute in a RADIUS
packet.
C. Transport Layer Security
The Transport Layer Security protocol as described in RFC-


























Fig. 3. Figure shows the complete set of messages exchanged during the
(re)association process. In particular, it shows the EAP/TLS authentication
messages, and the four-way handshake.
transport level. It is divided into two protocols : theandshake
protocol which handles the communication for the authentica-
tion and derives strong key material for the data transfer which
is carried over therecord protocol. The authentication part
of the TLS has been exported as an authentication mechanism
over EAP in the EAP/TLS RFC2716 [8]. This is the most com-
monly used authentication mechanism over EAP, and fits into
the IEEE 802.1X model.
In the application of TLS to IEEE 802.1X, the supplicant
and the authentication server have a certificate from a com-
mon trusted certificate authority (CA). The mutual authenti-
cation process based on these credentials achieves the follow-
ing: (i) mutual authentication of the client and the server,(ii)
a strong shared secret master key (MK) (iii) an initialized sts
of pseudo-random functions (PRFs) which can be utilized for
generating further key material. Let TLS-PRF denote the PRFs
generated as a result of the authentication. The MK is used to
derive a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) by using equation 1.
PMK = TLS-PRF( MK, ”client EAP encryption”j
clientHello.randomj serverHello.random)
(1)
The PMK is used along with certain cipher methods to derive
four Pairwise Transient Keys which are used various purposes
as shown in figure 42. The first key EAPOL-MIC key and the
EAPOL-Encr. keys are used to provide data origin authenticity
and confidentiality for the four-way handshake discussed later.2The interested reader is referred to [14] for a detailed description.
The other two keys are used for link layer encryption and au-
thenticity depending on the cipher suite being employed.
512 bits
EAPOL MIC Key Data Encrypt Key Data MIC Key
128 bits 128 bits 128 bits 128 bits
256 bits
Pairwise Master Key − PMK







Fig. 4. The key structure: PMK and the derived PTK.
D. Four way hand-shake
The IEEE 802.11 Task Group I defines an IEEE 802.1X pro-
tocol called a four-way handshake. This protocol is used to
confirm the liveness of the AP and the STA, guarantees the
freshness and synchronizes the shared session key and binds
the PMK to the MAC address of the STA. The communication
is carried using EAPOL key messages[15].
1) Message (A) Authenticator ! Supplicant: This is the
first EAPOL-Key message and is sent from the authen-
ticator to the supplicant. It contains ANonce – a nonce
value generated by the authenticator. Once the suppli-
cant has received this message it can compute the four
temporal keys.
2) Message (B) Supplicant ! Authenticator: This mes-
sage contains SNonce – a supplicant generated nonce and
a MIC over the message to protect its integrity. The au-
thenticator uses SNonce to generate the temporal keys,
and verifies the MIC.
3) Message (C) Authenticator ! Supplicant: This mes-
sage includes the earlier ANonce and a MIC check which
can be verified by the supplicant proving that the authen-
ticator has a matching PMK.
4) Message (D) Supplicant ! Authenticator: This mes-
sage signifies the completion of the four-way handshake
and signals the installation of the keys by both entities
for the data communication.
The four-way handshake protocol is used during a full-
authentication and during re-authentication, and hence this cost
(i.e. the overhead incurred) will be present in both situations.
We also do not include the cost of the hand-shake in the timings
of EAP/TLS. In this work, we do not implement the handshake
for the above reason, instead we have implemented a simpler
two-way handshake mechanism for demonstration purposes.
E. TGi Trust Relationships
One of the interesting, and disappointing, problems with
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Fig. 5. The Trust relations in TGi.
ships in an operational network. Many people believe that the
access point is a trusted party, and this isn’t completely corre t.
Figure 5 depicts the trust relationships within TGi. The solid
arrows represent an explicit mutual trust relationship while the
dotted line represents an implicit trust relationship thatMUST
be created in order to make security claims about the commu-
nications path. This trust relationship between the AP and the
STA is transitive and derived from the fact that the station trusts
the AAA server and the AAA server trusts the AP. This, unfor-
tunately, is not ideal since in many cases the trust relationship
between the AAA server and the AP will not exist if shared
keys are not used to protect the RADIUS traffic. However, the
majority of the AP vendors in TGi had a strong desire for an
inexpensive AP and be more of a relay than a participant in the
communications.
F. Properties of a Successful Authentication
After the successful completion of the EAP/TLS authentica-
tion phase the following statements hold:
1) The mobile station’s identity has been proven.
2) Based on the above identity, the mobile station’s access
to the network has been granted by the AAA server.
3) The mobile station and the AAA server share a strong
master secret,MK.
4) The mobile station, the AAA server, and the associated
access point all share a common secret, pairwise master
key orPMK, derived from theMK.
5) A session key,PTK, is derived from thePMK using
the four-way handshake and is only shared between the
mobile station and the associated access point.
III. N EIGHBOR GRAPHS
In this section, we describe the notion of the neighbor graph
datastructure, and the abstractions they provide. Neighbor
graphs are used to determine the candidate set of access point
that a roaming STA could potentially reassociate to. Usually
this candidate set is a small fraction of the total number of APs
forming the wireless network. Hence schemes which proac-
tively transfer STA context and key material to this candidate
set of APs prior to reassociation become feasible.
A. Definitions
Reassociation Relationship: Two APs, say,api andapj are
said to satisfy a reassociation relationship if it is possible for a
STA to perform an 802.11 reassociation through some path of
motion between the physical locations ofapi andapj .
Consider the placement of APs in a simple in-building sce-
nario as shown in figure 6. The dotted lines show a potential
path of motion. The APs A and E satisfy the reassociation rela-
tionship, because there exists a path of motion (as can be seen
from the figure) by which an STA can reassociate between A
and E.
The reassociation relationship depends on the placement of
APs, signal strength and other topological factors and in may
cases corresponds to the physical distance (vicinity) betwe n
the APs. The reassociation relationship between APs forms the
basis for the construction of the neighbor graph datastructu e
as discussed below.
AP Neighbor Graph: Define a undirected graphG = (V;E)
whereV = fap1; ap2; : : : ; apng is the set of all APs (consti-
tuting the wireless network under consideration), and there is
an edgee = (api; apj) betweenapi andapj if they satisfy a
reassociation relationship.












Movement of the Station
Fig. 6. Figure shows an example placement of APs and the corresponding
neighbor graph.
Association Pattern:Define theassociation pattern () for
client  as f(ap1; t1); (ap2; t2); : : : ; (apn; tn)g, whereapi is
the AP to which the STA reassociates (new-AP) at timeti andf(api; ti) , (api+1; ti+1)g is such that the handoff occurs fromapi toapi+1 at timeti+1; the STA maintains continuous logical
network connectivity from timet1 to tn.
The neighbor graph and the association pattern are related
according to the following observation. We define theLocality
of Mobility principle to state that for a client, with association
pattern () as defined above, the neighbor graphG = (V;E)
captures thelocality (of motion) in the association pattern i.e.
for any two successive APs, say,api andapi+1 in  () the
edgee = (api; api+1) 2 E. This concept of locality is the
abstraction captured by the neighbor graph as a datastructure.
B. Implementation Issues
The neighbor graph can be autonomously learned and main-
tained by a wireless network without the need for any manual
configuration. Also the datastructure can be maintained either
in a distributed fashion by the APs themselves [16], or in a
centralized manner at the authentication server as in this pa-
per. In this application of neighbor graphs for proactive key-
distribution, we construct and maintain the datastructureat the
authentication server (RADIUS).
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1) Edge Creation: Edges can be created either on the receipt
of an 802.11reassociation requestframe by an AP or
explicitly by APs themselves on re-authentication. Also
if the APs implement the IEEE 802.1f Inter-Access Point
Protocol, the receipt of aMove-Notifymessage can also
induce an edge in the graph.
2) Edge Deletion: Unused and stale edges (i.e. reassocia-
tions paths which rarely occur) can be deleted over time
in an LRU fashion. This is necessary in order to delete
incorrectly added edges. One situation where this could
happen is a client that goes into the power save mode, and
potentially wakes up in a different location to reassociate
to any arbitrary AP on the wireless network.
The autonomous generation also eliminates the need for any
survey or other manual construction methods. As a result, this
also makes the datastructure adaptive to changes in the reas-
sociation relationship which might occur because of topology
changes (i.e. changes in AP placements, physical topology,
etc).
IV. PRO-ACTIVE KEY DISTRIBUTION
Pro-active key distribution seeks to reduce the latency of the
authentication phase by pre-distributing key material ahead of
a mobile station. Our approach provides all of the same proper-
ties of a full EAP/TLS authentication, but at significantly less
cost in terms of latency and computational power of the mobile
station.
A. PMK Trees
In the current, 802.11i framework thePMK is derived from
theMK by equation 1. Pre-distributing thisPMK, which is
currently permitted in the current TGi draft asPMK caching,
violates the current TGi trust assumptions3. Rather than pre-
distribute thisPMK, we change the derivation of thePMK
to the recurrence shown in equation 2, wheren represents thenth reassociation forn >= 0.PMK0 = TLS-PRF(MK,”client EAP encryption”j
clientHello.randomj serverHello.random)PMKn = TLS-PRF(MK,PMKn 1j AP MACj STAMAC )
(2)
The recurrence shown in equation creates aPMK tree with
the reassociation pattern, (STA), a path within the tree as
shown in figure 7. In figure 7, the reassociation pattern is (STA) = A;B;C;D.
B. PMK Synchronization
There are two conditions that can exist when a mobile station
arrives at an access point with respect to the pre-distribution of
the correctPMK: either the AP and the mobile station share
the samePMK, or they do not. The handshake (two-way in
our case and four-way in the case of TGi) determines which of
these cases exist. This also ensures bothlivenessandfreshness
of the key.3Yes. TGi knows they are doing this.
Fig. 7. PMK tree
C. PMK Distribution
Once a mobile station completes an initial full EAP/TLS
authentication as denoted by by the AAA server sending an
ACCESS-ACCEPTmessage to the access point indicating suc-
cessful completion of the authentication process as well asPMK0. At this point, the AAA server and the mobile sta-
tion share theMK, and the AAA server, the access point, and
the mobile station all sharePMK0. The AAA server now
determines the neighbors of the associated access point and
sends aNOTIFY-REQUESTthat a specific mobile station may
roam into the coverage area of each of the neighboring access
points [17]. This message is advisory only, and an access point
may or may not decide to request the security association, orPMK from the AAA server at this time. If the AP does decide
to request thePMK, then the AP sends aNOTIFY-ACCEPT
message. If not, then the AP sends aNOTIFY-REJECTmes-
sage to the AAA server. Upon receiving theNOTIFY-ACCEPT
message, the AAA server responds with anACCESS-ACCEPT
message which contains the appropriatePMK as well as au-
thorization for the mobile station to remain connected to the
network.
D. Two-way handshake
After the key distribution, the four-way handshake (dis-
cussed earlier) confirms the freshness of the keys being used
by the AP and the roaming STA. In our implementation, we
used a simpler two-way handshake (an EAPOL start message,
and an EAP-Success message if the AP has the correct key) for
purposes of demonstration. Since the four-way handshake is
performed during both – a full authentication and the fast re-
authentication, it does not effect the key distribution scheme.
V. I MPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present implementation results to demon-
strate the performance of the proactive key distribution scheme.
We have implemented the fast re-authentication (using the key
distribution scheme) and the standard full-authentication over
an in-building wireless testbed network comprising of 9 access
points spread over three floors. Since the four-way handshake
process appears in both schemes after the key has been deliv-
ered, we did not implement the full version and we instead im-
plemented a simple 2-way handshake to verify the key fresh-
ness. We measured 90 full EAP-TLS authentication latencies
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which result in an average of approx. 1.1 seconds. Using the
proactive key distribution scheme for fast re-authentication we
obtained an average latency of 48 ms (a 99.6% reduction). Also
we measured the overhead incurred by two additional message
between the RADIUS server and the authenticator. With eight













Fig. 8. Figure shows the topological placement of the APs in our wireless
testbed and the resulting structure of the neighbor graph.
The wireless testbed network spans three floors (2nd, 3rd and
4th) of a university building and consists of nine APs as shown
in figure 8. The access point is based on a NET4521Soekris
[18] board, which has a 133 MHz AMD processor, 64MB
SDRAM, two PC-Card/Cardbus slots for wireless adapters and
oneCompactFlashsocket. The board is powered usingPower
Over Ethernethrough the ethernet cable. A 200mW Prism 2.5
based wireless card is used as the AP interface with a 1ftyagi
antenna. OpenBSD 3.3 with access point functionality is used
as the operating system.
The supplicant and the authenticator software is based on
the open1x[19] implementation built here. We also use the
Freeradius[20] software for the RADIUS server, modified to
implement the key distribution scheme and maintain the neigh-
bor graph datastructure. The RADIUS server is installed on
a backend machine (PIII 551.247 MHz, 128 MB RAM). The
Xsupplicantand theauthenticator[19] software was modified
to include the simple two-way handshake instead of the four-
way handshake for purposes of demonstration.
B. Experimental Results
The experimental setup consisted of a supplicant roaming in
the wireless testbed. A laptop with PIII 1.8 GHz, 256 MB RAM
and a Prism 2.5 basedDemarcTechwireless card [21] is used as
the supplicant. Three experiments were done to measure thre
different latencies as detailed below:4Note that this overhead plays no role in the re-authentication latency, and
just adds to the load on the RADIUS server. We include it here fo the sake of
completeness.
1) Measuring Full-authentication Latency:The supplicant
was made to roam from one AP to another in the wireless
network, and a full IEEE 802.1X EAP TLS authentica-
tion was performed at each reassociation. We measured
90 such authentications resulting in an average latency of
1.1 seconds.
2) Fast Re-authentication: Fast re-authentication using
proactive key distribution was enabled on the RADIUS
and the authenticators. The RADIUS server was initial-
ized with the neighbor graph shown in figure 8. We use
a static neighbor graph for ease of demonstration. The
graph used in our experiments was constructed by human
observation of the reassociation messages. Autonomous
construction methods detailed earlier should be used in
order to keep the neighbor graph fresh and dynamic and
this has no effect on the performance of the key distri-
bution scheme. Figure 9 shows the authentication laten-
cies. The first authentication (which occurs at the start
of a session), is a full-authentication and hence incurs
a high latency (approx. 800 ms); while all subsequent
18 re-authentications reflect the latency of the two-way
handshake.
3) Overhead at the RADIUS server:In this experiment we
measured the additional overhead incurred by communi-
cation required for distributing the keys proactive using
theNotify-Request, Notify-Acceptand theAccess-Accept
messages. We measured 80 authentications and obtained
an average latency of 21 ms. This overhead does not in-


























Re-Authentications ( Avg = 50 ms )
Fig. 9. Figure shows the authentication latencies as observed by the roaming
supplicant in the wireless testbed, with proactive key distribu ion enabled. As
can be seen, the first authentication reflects the full-authentication latency and
initiates the key distribution mechanism.
VI. RELATED WORK
Pack [22], [23] proposes a fast handoff scheme using apre-
dictive authentication method based on IEEE 802.1X model.
In their scheme, pre-authentication is performed to thek most
likely next access points. Thek stations are selected using a
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weighted matrix representing the likelihood (based on the anal-
ysis of past network behavior) that a station, associated toAPi,
will move toAPj . The mobile station may select only the most
likely next access points to pre-authenticate, or it may select
all of the potential next access points [22], [23]. Pack usesth
notion of a frequent handoff region (FHR) to represent the adja-
cent access points which is obtained by examining the weightd
matrix. The weights within the matrix are based on anO( 2)
analysis of RADIUS log information using the inverse of the ra-
tio the number of handoffs fromAPi toAPj to the time spent
by the mobile station atAPi prior to the handoff. In the pa-
per [22], pre-authentication means the following. When a sta-
tion authenticates toAPi, authentication server (AAA server)
sends security information not only toAPi but also to other
APs in FHR. As a consequence, the next handoff to one of APs
in FHR does not require any message exchanges between the
AP and the AAA server, because the AP already has the secu-
rity information.
There are several issues with pre-authentication. Firstly, pre-
authentication can not occur beyond the first access router de
to the fact that EAPOL packets are used to carry authentication
information. This severely limits the ability to pre-authenticate
to single LANs only and prohibits WAN and Inter-network
roaming. Secondly, the cost of a full reassociation is prohibitive
for a capable device as in the laptop used in our experiments.
Imagine the times for a small handset using a low powered pro-
cessor. In addition, the authentication process must be accom-
plished to each potential neighbor. Thus, the cost is several
seconds rather than milli-seconds. During the authentication
time, by the way, the mobile station is on a different channel
and unable to process traffic from or from the currently asso-
ciated access point. Finally, unless there is a significant over-
lap in coverage pre-authentication will just not work due tothe
length of times cited earlier.
For the construction of FHR matrix, it requiresO(n2) com-
putation and space, wheren is the number of access points in
the network, and must be created at the authentication server
(AS). Furthermore, the FHR notion does not quickly adapt to
changes in the network topology. This is in contrast to our
neighbor graphs which requireO(degree(ap)) computation
and storage space per AP and which quickly adapt to changes
in the network topology. Additionally, neighbor graphs canbe
utilized either in a distributed fashion at each access point, r
client, and in a centralized fashion at the AS.
VII. C ONCLUSIONS
Wireless networking has changed considerably over the last
decade, and the next decade will likely see the ubiquity of wire-
less network service achieved. Accomplishing this goal wil
require the inter-working of different administrative domains,
and different physical layers. If Wi-Fi networks are to be par-
ticipants in this vision, then the current hand-off latencies must
be reduced significantly.
In this paper, we presented a novel data structure, neighbor
graphs, along with the addition of new messages to RADIUS
that enables the pre-distribution of thePMK ahead of a mo-
bile station. We also demonstrated this approach provides the
same level of security as a 1.1 second full EAP/TLS authenti-
cation, but at a significantly lower latency 20 ms as shown by
laboratory and 50 ms as shown by test-bed experiments.
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